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Abstract
In this note, we characterize the form of an invertible quantum operation, i.e., a completely positive
trace preserving linear transformation (a CPTP map) whose inverse is also a CPTP map. The precise
form of such maps becomes important in contexts such as self-testing and encryption. We show that
these maps correspond to applying a unitary transformation to the state along with an ancilla initialized
to a fixed state, which may be mixed.
The characterization of invertible quantum operations implies that one-way schemes for encrypting
quantum states using a classical key may be slightly more general than the “private quantum channels”
studied by Ambainis, Mosca, Tapp and de Wolf [1, Section 3]. Nonetheless, we show that their results,
most notably a lower bound of 2n bits of key to encrypt n quantum bits, extend in a straightforward
manner to the general case.
1 Introduction
The most general physically allowed operation on a quantum state consists of coupling it to another system
(an ancilla) in a known state, via a unitary transformation, and then discarding part of the system. (In
this article, a quantum state may be mixed and is modeled by a density matrix.) We say that a quantum
operation E is invertible, if there is another quantum operation D such that DE(ρ) = ρ for every state ρ
in the domain of E. Mathematically, a quantum operation corresponds to a completely positive trace
preserving linear transformation, a CPTP map [8, Section 8.2]. A CPTP map may be an invertible linear
transformation, but may not correspond to an invertible quantum operation in the sense defined above.
For example, the depolarizing channel is an invertible CPTP map, but its inverse is not even positive.
However, if a CPTP map corresponds to an invertible quantum operation, it is necessarily also injective,
∗Department of Combinatorics and Optimization, and Institute for Quantum Computing, University of Waterloo, 200
University Ave. W., Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1, Canada. E-mail: anayak@math.uwaterloo.ca. Research supported in part
by NSERC, CIAR, MITACS, CFI, and OIT (Canada). A.N. is also Associate Member, Perimeter Institute for Theoretical
Physics, Waterloo, Canada. Research at Perimeter Institute is supported in part by the Government of Canada through
NSERC and by the Province of Ontario through MEDT.
†School of Technology and Computer Science, Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Homi Bhabha Road, Colaba,
Mumbai 400005, India. Email: pgdsen@tcs.tifr.res.in. This research was done while the author was at NEC Laboratories
America, Inc., Princeton, NJ, U.S.A.
1
and therefore invertible on its image. This is because there is a basis for the domain consisting of density
matrices alone.
In this note, we characterize the form of an invertible quantum operation. The precise form of such maps
becomes important in contexts such as self-testing [11] and encryption [1]. A unitary operation is a natural
example of a CPTP map that is also invertible. It seems intuitively obvious that all invertible quantum
operations also be unitary. This is indeed the case for CPTP maps transforming a Hilbert space into
itself [9, Chapter 3, Section 8, Exercise 3.2]. Here, we examine the more general case, where an invertible
quantum operation may take d-dimensional states to states in a Hilbert space of possibly larger dimension.
We show that these maps correspond to applying a unitary transformation to the state along with an ancilla
initialized to a fixed state, which may be mixed (Theorem 2.1). We also extend this characterization to
completely positive (CP) maps in Theorem 2.2. Its significance lies in the fact that when suitably scaled
by a positive real number, CP maps correspond to the result of getting one of a subset of outcomes on a
measurement.
Invertible quantum operations also occur in the context of error correction. There, the goal is to find a
linear subspace of a Hilbert space such that the restriction of the noise operator to this space is invertible.
The proof of our characterization theorem closely follows the proof of the error-correction criterion [8,
page 436, Theorem 10.1].
A notion related to error-correction is that of a reversible quantum operation. Several authors [6, 7] consider
operations that are completely positive maps defined by the process of making a measurement, and getting
one of a subset of outcomes. They call such an operation E reversible on a subspace, if for all states ρ in the
subspace, there is a quantum operation D such that D(E(ρ))/Tr(E(ρ)) = ρ. Nielsen et al. [7] characterize
such operations in information theoretic as well as algebraic terms (akin to the error-correction criterion).
Theorem 2.1 has implications for perfect encryption of quantum states using a classical private key (see,
e.g., Ref. [1]). These protocols for encryption, also called “private quantum channels” by some authors,
involve two parties, labeled Alice and Bob. The two parties share a secret, uniformly random bit-string k,
called the private key. Alice wishes to send a quantum message, a d-dimensional quantum state ρ, to
Bob. She would like to apply an invertible CPTP map Ek to the state, and send it to Bob so that when
averaged over k, the result is a fixed density matrix (independent of the message). This would ensure that
no eavesdropper be able to distinguish two different messages with any degree of success, and therefore
guarantee information theoretic security. Bob, who also has the key k, can apply the inverse operation Dk
to decrypt the message ρ perfectly. (We have implicitly assumed that the quantum channel is noiseless
unless an eavesdropper tampers with it.)
The characterization of invertible quantum operations implies that in the most general one-way encryption
scheme, Alice may apply a unitary operation to the state to be encrypted along with an ancilla that depends
upon the key . This is slightly more general than the form studied by Ambainis, Mosca, Tapp and de Wolf [1,
Section 3], where the ancilla is assumed to be independent of the key. Nonetheless, their results, most
notably a lower bound of 2n bits of key to encrypt n quantum bits, extend in a straightforward manner to
the general case. We summarize these observations in Section 3.
The lower bound of 2n classical key bits needed to encrypt quantum states was also shown by Boykin and
Roychowdhury [2], assuming that no ancilla is used . Their proof was simplified by Ambainis et al. [1].
Since the addition of ancilla results in longer ciphertext, and hence is less efficient, this case is of special
interest. We observe that this 2n lower bound follows directly from a “rank argument”.
We point out that information theoretic proofs due to DiVincenzo, Hayden, and Terhal [3, Section IV]
and Jain [4] follow a different route to the same lower bound on the length of key for general one-way
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encryption schemes. We also note that the requirement of perfect information theoretic security imposes
an additional constraint on the maps Ek, apart from invertibility. This constraint may simplify the math-
ematical structure of these schemes, and further simplify the proofs we give.
2 Invertible quantum operations
We refer the reader to the text [8] for basic concepts related to quantum states and operations, and present
our characterization theorem directly.
Let L(H) denote the set of linear operators on the Hilbert space H.
Theorem 2.1 Let E : L(Cp) → L(Cq) be a completely positive, trace preserving linear transformation (a
CPTP map). Suppose there is a CPTP map D : L(Cq) → L(Cp) such that DE(ρ) = ρ for all density
matrices ρ ∈ L(Cp). I.e., E is an invertible quantum operation with inverse D.
Then there is a density matrix ω ∈ L(C⌊q/p⌋), and a unitary operation on Cq such that E(ρ) = U(ρ⊗ω)U †.
Furthermore, D corresponds to applying U †, and tracing out the ⌊q/p⌋ dimensional ancilla.
Proof: As mentioned in Section 1, there is a close analogy between error-correction, and the invertibility
of quantum operations. If we view Cp as a code subspace, and E as a noisy channel restricted to this
subspace, then the decoding map D corrects any “errors” introduced by E. We may thus appeal to the
error-correction criterion [8, page 436, Theorem 10.1] to give a short proof of the theorem. Instead, in
the interest of completeness, we present the details below. Those familiar with the criterion may skip to
Equation (2) and then to Equation (3) after picking up the notation in the next paragraph.
A CPTP map from L(Cn) to L(Cm) can be expressed in terms of linear transformations from Cn to Cm
(Kraus operators), using an operator sum representation [8, Exercise 8.3]. Suppose we express both maps E
andD in terms of some set of Kraus operators {Ai}i∈I and {Bj}j∈J , respectively. Then, by the invertibility
of E, we have, for every ρ ∈ L(Cp)
DE(ρ) =
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
BjAi ρ A
†
iB
†
j = ρ.
Thus, the CPTP operation DE defined on L(Cp) may equivalently be expressed in terms of the single
Kraus operator Ip, the identity operator on C
p. By the unitary equivalence of Kraus representations [8,
Page 372, Theorem 8.2], there are complex numbers αij, such that
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J |αji|2 = 1, and for all i ∈ I,
j ∈ J ,
BjAi = αji Ip .
Therefore for all i, i′ ∈ I, ∑
j∈J
A†i′B
†
jBjAi = βi′i Ip,
where
βi′i =
∑
j∈J
α¯ji′αji. (1)
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Observe that M = (βi′i)i′,i∈I is a Hermitian matrix. Since,
∑
j∈J B
†
jBj = Iq, we have for all i, i
′ ∈ I,
A†i′Ai = βi′iIp. (2)
The conditions in Equation (2) imply that each Kraus operator Ai is a scaled isometric embedding of C
p
into Cq. However, the resulting images need not be mutually orthogonal. We therefore first derive an
equivalent representation for E in which the Kraus operators embed into orthogonal subspaces.
Using equation (1) above, we have that for any vector x ∈ CI ,
(x†Mx) =
∑
i,i′∈I
x¯i′ βi′i xi
=
∑
i,i′∈I
∑
j∈J
x¯i′ α¯ji′ αji xi
=
∑
j∈J
(∑
i′∈I
x¯i′ α¯ji′
)(∑
i∈I
xi αji
)
≥ 0.
So the matrix M is positive semi-definite. Moreover
Tr(M) =
∑
i∈I
βii =
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
|αji|2 = 1.
Let V = (vi′i)i′,i∈I be a unitary matrix that diagonalizes M . Let Γ = V †MV be the resulting diagonal
matrix, with γi = Γii ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I, and
∑
i∈I γi =
∑
i∈I βii = 1. Then the Kraus operators Ck =∑
i vik Ai, k ∈ I also represent the same map E, as may be checked by direct substitution (cf. [8, Page 372,
Theorem 8.2]). Moreover, the range spaces of the various operators Ck are orthogonal. In fact for k, k
′ ∈ I,
C†k′Ck =
(∑
i′∈I
v¯i′k′ A
†
i′
)(∑
i∈I
vik Ai
)
=
∑
i′,i∈I
v¯i′k′ vik
(
A†i′Ai
)
=
∑
i′,i∈I
v¯i′k′ vik (βi′i Ip)
=

∑
i′,i∈I
v¯i′k′ βi′i vik

 · Ip
= Γk′k Ip
= δk′k γk Ip, (3)
where δ is the Kronecker delta function.
Define K = {k ∈ I : γk 6= 0}. Looking at the singular value decomposition of Ck, k ∈ K, we now conclude
that all its singular values are equal to
√
γk, and that the various operators Ck are scaled unitary embeddings
of Cp into orthogonal subspaces of Cq: Ck =
√
γk
∑
l∈[p] |ykl〉〈u(k)l |, where {ykl}k∈K,l∈[p] is an orthonormal
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set of vectors in Cq, and
{
u
(k)
l
}
l∈[p]
is an orthonormal basis of Cp for each k ∈ K. As a consequence, q ≥ p,
and |K| ≤ ⌊q/p⌋.
We may now define ω =
∑
k∈K γk |wk〉〈wk|, where {wk}k∈K is an orthonormal set in C⌊q/p⌋. Define U as
any unitary extension to Cq of the map:
|u(k)l 〉 ⊗ |wk〉 7→ |ykl〉,
where k ∈ K and l ∈ [p]. A straightforward check confirms that E may be implemented by applying U
to any state in Cp tensored with ancilla ω. Similarly, the inverse operation D may be implemented by
applying U † and tracing out the state ω.
The proof of the invertibility criterion tells us how to deal with the subtlety that the ancillary density
matrix ω may be expressed as a multitude of mixtures, each of which gives rise to a different Kraus
representation for the map E. For an arbitrary mixture
∑
t rt |φt〉〈φt| = ω, the resulting Kraus opera-
tors Et =
√
rt U(Ip ⊗ |φt〉) are not necessarily in the form from which the operator U is evident. The
diagonalization of the matrix M in the proof corresponds exactly to the diagonalization of ω and this
allows us to “read out” the unitary matrix, and the ancilla state ω itself.
The converse of our theorem is manifestly true, so it provides a characterization of invertible quantum
operations. An alternative characterization was pointed out to us by Jon Tyson [10]. Below, we state an
extension of his characterization to completely positive (CP) but not necessarily trace preserving maps,
and sketch its proof.
Theorem 2.2 A completely positive (CP) linear transformation E : L(Cp) → L(Cq) has a CP inverse D
iff there exists a positive semi-definite linear operator Q ∈ L(Cq) and a real number c > 0 such that for all
density matrices ρ, σ ∈ L(Cp),
Tr(QE(ρ)QE(σ)) = c · Tr(ρσ).
In addition, a CPTP map E has a CPTP inverse D iff Q may be taken to be the identity operator Iq in
the above characterization.
Proof: We first sketch a proof of the forward direction of the theorem. Suppose we have a CP map E
with a CP inverse D. Express E and D in terms of some set of Kraus operators {Ai}i∈I and {Bj}j∈J ,
respectively. Arguing as in the proof of Equation (2) of Theorem 2.1, we have for all i, i′ ∈ I,
A†i′QAi = βi′i Ip, (4)
where Q =
∑
j∈J B
†
jBj and βi′i is as in Equation (1). Note that Q is positive semi-definite. From
Equation (4), it follows that Tr(QE(ρ)QE(σ)) = c · Tr(ρσ), where c = ∑i,i′∈I |βi,i′ |2. Note that c > 0
since
∑
i∈I βii = 1 as in the proof of Theorem 2.1.
We now sketch a proof of the reverse direction of the theorem. The condition Tr(QE(ρ)QE(σ)) = c·Tr(ρσ),
with Q positive semi-definite and c > 0 implies that
c Tr(ρσ) = Tr(QE(ρ)QE(σ)) = Tr

∑
i,i′∈I
QAiρA
†
iQAi′σA
†
i′


= Tr

ρ ∑
i,i′∈I
A†iQAi′σA
†
i′QAi

 ,
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for all density matrices ρ, σ. This means that
∑
i,i′∈I A
†
iQAi′σA
†
i′QAi = c σ for all density matrices σ, since
density matrices ρ form a basis for L(Cp). This implies that the CPTP map defined by
{
c−1/2A†iQAi′
}
i,i′∈I
is the identity map on L(Cp). By the unitary equivalence of Kraus operators, we see that there are
complex numbers
{
βi,i′
}
i,i′∈I ,
∑
i,i′ |βi,i′ |2 = c such that A†iQAi′ = βi,i′Ip, for all i, i′ ∈ I. Taking trace,
we have βi,i′ = p
−1TrA†iQAi′ . The matrix M = (βi,i′)i,i′∈I is Hermitian, and by arguing as in the proof
of Theorem 2.1 we see that M is positive semi-definite. Let E′ denote the CP map given by the Kraus
operators
{
Q1/2Ai
}
i∈I . Now we follow the proof of Theorem 2.1 from the argument for Equation (3)
onwards to conclude that there exists a positive semi-definite matrix ω ∈ L(C⌊q/p⌋), and a unitary operation
U on Cq such that E′(ρ) = U(ρ ⊗ ω)U † for all density matrices ρ in L(Cp). This shows that E has a CP
inverse D which corresponds to conjugating by U †Q1/2, and tracing out the ⌊q/p⌋-dimensional ancilla ω.
Suppose now that CPTP map E has a CPTP inverse D. In the above argument, we get Q =
∑
j∈J B
†
jBj =
Iq. Conversely, suppose that CPTP map E satisfies Tr(E(ρ)E(σ)) = c·Tr(ρσ), c > 0 for all density matrices
ρ, σ ∈ L(Cp). The trace preserving property of E implies that the matrix M in the above argument has
unit trace. This implies that the positive semi-definite matrix ω has unit trace, that is, ω is a density
matrix. This shows that E has a CPTP inverse D which corresponds to applying U †, and tracing out
the ⌊q/p⌋-dimensional ancilla ω.
3 Perfect encryption of quantum states
A one-way protocol for perfect encryption of quantum states in L(Cd) consists of a probability distri-
bution {pk, Ek} over invertible quantum operations Ek : L(Cd) → L(CD) such that the image of every
state ρ ∈ L(Cd) under the map
R(ρ) =
∑
k
pk Ek(ρ)
is a fixed state σ ∈ L(CD). This is also known as a randomization scheme, or a private quantum channel .
As mentioned in Section 1, the probability distribution {pk} corresponds to a random secret key that two
parties Alice and Bob share. The map Ek is an encryption map that Alice applies to her quantum message ρ,
and its inverse is the decryption map that Bob applies to retrieve the message. To an eavesdropper with
no information about the secret key, the density matrix of the ciphertext is exactly σ = R(ρ). Since this
is completely independent of the message, the protocol achieves information theoretic security.
Our characterization theorem from the previous section implies that the most general one-way quantum
encryption scheme R (with no decoding error in the absence of eavesdropping) is of the following form:
for each value of key k, there is an ancilla ωk, possibly mixed, and a unitary Uk such that E(ρ) =∑
k pk Uk(ρ⊗ωk)U †k . This is slightly more general than the form assumed by Ambainis, Mosca, Tapp, and
de Wolf [1, Section 3], in that the ancilla may depend on the value of the key. However, their results,
especially a proof that 2n bits of key are required to encrypt n quantum bits, extend to this form of
encryption in a straightforward manner. Below we give a sketch of this extension.
We begin with the following the lemma.
Lemma 3.1 Let {pk, Ek} define a perfect encryption map R for d-dimensional quantum states in L(Cd).
Then, for any two orthogonal states |i〉, |j〉 ∈ L(Cd), R(|i〉〈j|) = 0.
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A simple proof of this lemma occurs in Theorem 5.2 of Ref. [5], and works verbatim for an encryption scheme
as described above. We need only consider the action of R on the states |i〉, |j〉, 1√
2
(|i〉+ |j〉), 1√
2
(|i〉+ i|j〉),
where i =
√−1, to arrive at the lemma. (A stronger version of this lemma occurs as Lemma 4.4 in Ref. [1]
and also generalizes verbatim.)
An immediate corollary of Lemma 3.1 is that if one half of a bipartite Bell state is encrypted, the resulting
bipartite state is independent of which Bell state was encrypted. In fact, if the encryption procedure is
applied to the first half of the any input Bell state, the resulting state is proportional to σ ⊗ I where σ
the output state of the encryption procedure. Using this property, Ambainis et al. [5, 1] show that any
protocol to encrypt n quantum bits may be transformed to a protocol that encrypts 2n classical bits.
Lemma 3.2 Let {pk, Ek} define a perfect encryption map R for n qubit states. Then, there is a map R′
given by a distribution {pk, E′k} that perfectly encrypts 2n classical bits (i.e., a fixed basis of C2
2n
).
The idea behind this lemma is to encode the 2n bits into orthogonal Bell states over 2n qubits, then encrypt
one half of the Bell state using R and finally send the bipartite state across as the encrypted message. The
map R′ is given by the composition of these steps.
Finally, we show how to extend Theorem 5.3 of Refs. [5, 1]. The proof relies on concepts from quantum
information theory. We refer the reader to the two papers, and the text [8] for the required background.
Lemma 3.3 Let {pk, Ek} define a perfect encryption map R for m classical bits. Then, the Shannon
entropy H(p) of the distribution p is at least m.
Proof: Consider σ, the result of encrypting the basis state |0〉〈0|. Then, R(|0〉〈0|) = σ = R(I/2m), since
the completely mixed state may be viewed as a mixture of (classical) basis states. So
σ =
∑
k
pk Ek(|0〉〈0|)
=
∑
k
pk Uk(|0〉〈0| ⊗ ωk)U †k
=
∑
k
pk Uk
(
I
2m
⊗ ωk
)
U †k .
Invoking Theorem 11.10 on page 518 of Ref. [8], the von Neumann entropy of σ may be bounded above as
S(σ) = S
(∑
k
pk Ek(|0〉〈0|)
)
≤ H(p) +
∑
k
pk S(Ek(|0〉〈0|))
= H(p) +
∑
k
pk S(Uk(|0〉〈0| ⊗ ωk)U †k)
= H(p) +
∑
k
pk S(ωk).
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By concavity of von Neumann entropy, S(σ) may also be bounded from below as
S(σ) = S
(∑
k
pk Uk(
I
2m
⊗ ωk)U †k
)
≥
∑
k
pk S
(
Uk(
I
2m
⊗ ωk)U †k
)
=
∑
k
pk S
(
I
2m
⊗ ωk
)
=
∑
k
pk (S(I/2
m) + S(ωk))
= m+
∑
k
pk S(ωk).
The two bounds together give H(p) ≥ m.
Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 imply:
Theorem 3.4 Let {pk, Ek} define a perfect encryption map R for n qubits. Then, the Shannon en-
tropy H(p) of the distribution p is at least 2n.
A weaker version of this theorem, where the encryption operations Ek are chosen to be unitary, was shown
by Boykin and Roychowdhury [2]. We sketch how in this case, a lower bound of 2n bits for the size of key
follows from a simple rank argument.
Let {pk, Uk} define a perfect encryption map R for n qubits for some unitary operators Uk. Note that R
is a unital map; it maps the completely mixed state to itself. Therefore, the output state of R is the
completely mixed state σ = I2n2n . For any bipartite pure state ρ on 2n qubits, the rank of (I⊗R)ρ, where R
acts on one half of ρ, is at most the number of non-zero pk. However, from the corollary to Lemma 3.1
mentioned above, if we choose ρ to be any pure bipartite Bell state, one half of which is encrypted,
(I⊗R)ρ = I2n
2n
⊗ σ = I22n
22n
,
which has rank 22n. Thus, the support of the probability distribution of the secret key has size at least 22n,
which gives the claimed lower bound. Note that this does not imply the stronger claim of Theorem 3.4
that the entropy of the distribution is 2n, or the stronger characterization of optimal perfect encryption
schemes (without ancilla) due to Boykin and Roychowdhury [2, Section III].
References
[1] Andris Ambainis, Michele Mosca, Alain Tapp, and Ronald de Wolf. Private quantum channels. In
Proceedings of the 41st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 547–553. IEEE
Press, Los Alamitos, CA, USA, 2000.
[2] P. Oscar Boykin and Vwani Roychowdhury. Optimal encryption of quantum bits. Physical Review A,
67, 2003. Article no. 042317.
8
[3] David P. DiVincenzo, Patrick Hayden, and Barbara M. Terhal. Hiding quantum data. Foundations of
Physics, 33(11):1629–1647, 2003. David Mermin Festschrift. Also Technical Report quant-ph/0207147,
ArXiv.org Preprint Archive, http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/, July 2002.
[4] Rahul Jain. Resource requirements of private quantum channels. Pre-print quant-ph/0507075,
ArXiv.org e-print Archive, http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph, July 2005.
[5] Michele Mosca, Alain Tapp, and Ronald de Wolf. Private quantum channels and the cost
of randomizing quantum information. Pre-print quant-ph/0003101, ArXiv.org e-Print Archive,
http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph, March 2000.
[6] Michael A. Nielsen and Carlton M. Caves. Reversible quantum operations and their application to
teleportation. Physical Review A, 55(3):2547–2556, 1997.
[7] Michael A. Nielsen, Carlton M. Caves, Benjamin Schumacher, and Howard Barnum. Information-
theoretic approach to quantum error correction and reversible measurement. Proceedings of the Royal
Society of London A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences, 454(1969):277–304, 1998.
[8] Michael A. Nielsen and Isaac L. Chuang. Quantum Computation and Quantum Information. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2000.
[9] John Preskill. Quantum computation. Lecture Notes, available at
http://www.theory.caltech.edu/people/preskill/ph229/, California Institute of Technol-
ogy, Pasadena, CA, 1998.
[10] Jon Tyson. Personal communication, May 2006.
[11] Wim van Dam, Fre´de´ric Magniez, Michele Mosca, and Miklos Santha. Self-testing of universal and
fault-tolerant sets of quantum gates. In Proceedings of 32nd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing,
pages 688–696. ACM Press, New York, NY, USA, 2000.
9
